Under Article 20(5), the NCA of the Member State in whose territory the Commission inspection is to be conducted is obliged to actively assist the Commission during the inspection at the request of the Commission. According to paragraph 6 of the same article, the NCA must request the assistance of the police or of an equivalent enforcement authority if the Commission finds that an undertaking opposes the inspection ordered. The NCA must also guarantee judicial authorisation if this is required according to the national rules.
11
Judicial review of this act by the national courts is limited to the arbitrariness and excessiveness of the coercive measures. 12 The Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) confirmed in Roquette Frères 13 and subsequent case law 14 that only the EU courts have the competence to rule on the lawfulness of the inspection, which includes the necessity of the inspection and the adequacy of the reasons submitted by the Commission. 15 The authorisation of the national court in whose territory the inspection is conducted is necessary when the investigation concerns private premises. The judicial control of the national courts in this case is also limited to the arbitrariness and excessiveness of the coercive measures. 16 The Commission can request one of the NCAs to conduct the inspection on behalf of the Commission under Article 22(2). The NCAs are obliged to conduct the requested inspection and they do so on the basis of their national procedural law when exercising these powers.
case, can file an appeal at the CJEU under Article 263 TFEU. 26 The third party can also file an appeal where the Commission decides to make a commitment decision instead of a fining decision. 28 The designated NCAs could, therefore, be administrative or judicial in nature. The Member States were obliged to set up a sanctioning system providing for sanctions which are effective, proportionate and dissuasive for infringements of EU law.
29
The Regulation does not set any formal requirements concerning the internal organisation of the NCAs in relation to their independence. However, political independence of the NCAs has received considerable attention in recent policy documents. 30 EU law has, in other fields of economic regulation, focused on the independence of national regulatory agencies from market players, 31 However, while EU law is considerably detailed concerning the concept of independence and the EU Courts emphasised the importance of independence in the context of regulated markets, 32 the Courts have, so far, not formulated general principles on the independence of regulatory authorities. 33 Accordingly, while EU law requires regulators to be 26 See also K Cseres and J Mendes, 'Consumers' Access to EU 31 It was in 1988, in Directive 88/301 on competition in the markets in telecommunications terminal equipment that the Commission introduced in art 6 an obligation on the Member States to entrust the regulation of terminal equipment to a body independent from market parties active in the provision of telecoms services or equipment. This requirement of independence has also been implemented in the second liberalisation package in the energy and telecoms sector. 32 33 The latest package of liberalisation Directives of 2009 mentions a general principle of independence independent from political institutions, it has not laid down the criteria of independence that regulatory authorities must meet. 34 Correspondingly, Regulation 1/2003 does not specify any sort of requirements on the formal independence of NCAs. 35 Guidi's study on the independence of NCAs shows a large variation across Member States concerning institutional, personal and financial independence from central governments.
36
The Commission has recently started to plead for more independence for NCAs in order to enhance further the enforcement of EU competition law. 37 Article 4 of the recently proposed Directive on empowering NCAs 38 lays down detailed requirements on the independence of the NCAs from both political as well as market parties. At the same time, the proposed Directive obliges Member States to subject NCAs to proportionate accountability requirements as will be explained in section 3.1..
As mentioned above, 45 The proposed rules address independence and resources of the NCAs, decision-making and investigative powers, the issuing of fines, a common set of leniency conditions and mutual assistance. If the Directive is approved and implemented, it can form a major step in harmonizing the currently diverging procedural rules of public enforcement.
In current practice, the procedural rules differ among the Member States for the different stages of enforcement (monitoring, investigation and sanctioning (see Chapter 1)), for judicial review, as well as for the ability of NCAs to formally set enforcement priorities. In most Member States, the NCA has the possibility to impose a fine after the investigations phase, and this is the case both in the Netherlands and in Hungary. 54 In the Netherlands, the department that imposes the fine is separated from the department that conducts the investigations. Article 12q of the Dutch Establishment Act ACM requires the ACM not to involve the persons investigating an infringement in the decision-making concerning the fine. An infringement of this article leads to the annulment of the fine if the fining decision is appealed in court. 55 The decision-making department has full discretion to In all Member States, the fining decision of the NCA or court can be appealed and reviewed at (another) court. The national competition law systems differ on the types and numbers of court instances, the time limits, the burden of proof and the scope and intensity of judicial review. The relevant factors for judicial accountability will be described in section . 69 Ibid., art 15(2) and (3). For example, the Commission submitted a written observation to the Slovakian Supreme Court. In its amicus intervention, the Commission expressed its opinion on the parallel application of EU and national competition rules and the possibility to impose fines for abuse. Available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/brief/03_2013/sk_dot.pdf> and <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/court/antitrust_amicus_curiae.html> accessed 7 November 2016.
subgroups. 70 The ECN has a quasi-hierarchical structure in which the Commission still retains a central position. While other European regulatory networks emerged as an initiative of the Member States, the ECN was centrally designed and established by the Commission.
71
The two main pillars of the ECN are case allocation and information exchange. The rules for case allocation are laid down in the Network Notice. 72 Case allocation is based on the general principle of minimising the number of authorities involved in a single investigation; therefore, the competition authority, which opens the proceedings, remains competent to act until the end of the investigation. 73 However, reallocation of cases between network members is possible when necessary for the effective enforcement of EU competition rules. In these cases network members try to allocate the case to a single wellplaced authority as far as possible. 74 In order to qualify as well-placed, a 'material link'
between the infringement and the geographical jurisdiction of the authority in question must exist. 75 The Commission is well placed to initiate proceedings where the alleged violation affects competition in more than three Member States, or where a case is closely linked to other EU law provisions which may be exclusively or more effectively applied by the
Commission, if the Union interest requires the adoption of a Commission decision to develop
EU competition policy when a new competition issue arises or to ensure effective enforcement. 76 In those cases, the Commission can take over a case from the NCA. However, 70 The Director General's meeting is the forum for discussing major policy issues such as the review of the Commission's policy on art 102, the ECN leniency model programme, increases in food and energy prices and the financial crisis. The ECN Plenary discusses horizontal issues of common interest policy such as the ability of national competition authorities to disapply state measures in their application of the EU competition rules. Under the ECN Plenary forum several working groups operate that deal with horizontal issues of a legal, economic or procedural nature situated at the interface between EU law and the different national laws. The ECN's working group on cooperation issues and due process follows up on the state of convergence of enforcement procedures in the different Member States. The sectoral subgroups deal with issues from specific sectors such as energy, food, banking and payments. The working groups are created by the NCAs as their needs dictate; they are composed of expert officials from the NCAs and the Commission and they share views and best practices. 71 For example, the European Electricity Regulation Forum and the European Gas Regulation Forum were established as informal fora of sectoral public and private actors, which met infrequently and had no formal powers or organisation. Later, informal groups of national independent regulatory authorities were established, like the Independent Regulators Group (IRG) for telecommunications or The ECN has so far been functioning smoothly and successfully, 86 and it has been praised as an effective 'joint enterprise' between the Member States and the Commission.
However, in practice the Commission still retains a privileged position. It acts as the 'network manager' with an important capacity for monitoring and oversight. 87 Legally, the ECN is not an official EU institution, and it does not have any legal personality, as a consequence of which this cooperation is not subject to EU or national judicial control. This will be further analysed in section 3.
Interim Conclusion
The above analysis clearly shows that the enforcement of EU competition law is in fact based more on parallel enforcement and less on shared enforcement in the true sense of the word.
This also means that basically once case allocation has taken place the competent and bestplaced competition authority, either one of the 28 NCAs or the Commission, will deal with the case on a stand-alone basis. Moreover, while decentralisation was originally based on the concept of equality among enforcers, the factors mentioned above confirm the Commission's position as primus inter pares in this enforcement framework. The ECN as such does not have its own powers of enforcement and functions more as a forum for policy making.
Accountability
The bifurcated nature of the shared enforcement of EU competition law as analysed above and, more specifically, the way in which the ECN functions, raise the fundamental question of how the actors in the shared enforcement of EU competition law can be held accountable for their actions. The question of accountability is even more important in regard to the fact that the Commission has an influential role in the enforcement of competition law. The
Commission performs an important and highly discretionary role in clarifying the EU 94 These meetings may which may, for example, bring together the college of commissioners and the chairs of the parliamentary committees. Moreover, on the basis of this Framework Agreement, the EP and the Commission have also embarked on examining carefully any request made by either institution. In addition, the Commission commits to guaranteeing the Parliament access to its meetings and documents relating to legislative and budgetary procedures. 95 Article 17(3) TEU states that the Commission shall be completely independent in carrying out its responsibilities and that it shall neither seek nor take instructions from any government or other institution, body, office or entity. 96 In fact, the Parliament participates in competition debates primarily through the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee that takes the lead in legislative and accountability activities in this field. The actual effect of this discourse has, however, been questioned by one MEP in a debate in 2011: hoped that ACM would reconsider its analysis. 119 The ACM did, however, not fulfil this request. The Minister lacks the power to force the ACM to do so since the law prohibits him from interfering with individual cases which forms an important safeguard protecting ACM's independence in individual cases. 120 The supermarkets, producers and processors finally withdrew their initiative.
It strikes me about these annual debates on competition policy that there is a very friendly and polite exchange of views, and then the Commission just carries on with business as usual because the Commission has the exclusive powers in this area. I think, at a time where we are discussing economic governance for the European Union, that should change. The European
Secondly, regarding financial mechanisms, the ACM sends a draft budget to the Minister every year which the Minister establishes. 121 The idea to give the ACM legal personality which would limit the Minister's influence on the budget by giving the ACM the competence to ascertain its own budget and give the Minister only the competence to approve it was rejected by Parliament. 122 The Minister argued that the limitation of his competence would be undesirable with regards to his accountability towards the Parliament. 123 Literature has criticised the rejection in light of ACM's financial independence.
Thirdly, the Minister is involved in appointing the ACM's board, although the board operates independently in practice. 125 The Minister has limited competence to dismiss one of the board members for, among others reasons, incompetence. 126 ACM's staff is employed by the Ministry of Economic Affairs, while, in practice, the ACM hires the employees. 127 To guarantee independence, Article 9 EAA states that the board and employees of the ACM cannot receive any orders regarding individual cases from the responsible Minister.
In addition to abovementioned factors, three interesting factors influence ACM's decision-making process in individual cases. The first factor is certain targets set for fines that were adopted in the coalition agreement of the previous Dutch Government. 128 These fining targets describe the amount of fines (in Euros) to be imposed by the ACM for cartel infringements. 129 Many academics criticised these fining targets since they influence ACM's discretion in the enforcement of individual cases. 130 The targets for example influence the ACM's competence to set priorities which also includes the decision to not impose a fine or to use alternative enforcement instruments and the competence to set the amount of the fine.
In other words, it negatively affects independent enforcement by the ACM. When Parliament questioned the competent Minister about these targets, he argued that the targets do not interfere with the independence of the ACM, since if the ACM does not achieve the desired targets, this will not affect its budget or have any other consequences. 131 Another factor which influences the amount of the fines in individual cases is the fact that the guidelines that the ACM has to follow in its enforcement of competition law, for example as to the calculation of any fines, are drafted by the responsible Minister, restricting ACM's discretion. 132 Finally, the Minister has the competence to annul an ultra vires decision of the ACM.
133
In conclusion, while the ACM is an independent authority, the Minister and The Hungarian GVH is a budgetary institution and is independent from the Government: it cannot be given instructions by any governmental institution but only by law. 134 The President of the GVH is nominated by the Prime Minister, heard by the Hungarian Parliament and is appointed by the President of Hungary. The appointment lasts for six years (renewable) and this overlaps with the four-year period of the Government. The
President of the GVH cannot be dismissed except in specific and very serious circumstances, such as for committing a crime or misusing information certified as top secret. The operation and financial management of the GVH is completely autonomous and constitutes a separate chapter in the central budget. In contrast to the ACM, the GVH is held accountable to the Hungarian Parliament. As mentioned above, its President is heard by the Parliament before his or her appointment. Moreover, the GVH submits its annual reports to the Parliament and, on request, to the competent parliamentary committee on the activities of the GVH. In addition, according to the Hungarian Competition Act, the GVH has to publish the nonconfidential versions of all of its decisions and all of its final orders adopted at the conclusion of proceedings (the opening of which were made also public). Finally, the National Audit
Office controls how the GVH uses its financial resources. EU-wide coherence of public enforcement of competition rules, and encourages its further development. 146 The EP pointed out that the ECN is a cooperation forum and is essential for the strengthening of the consistency and effectiveness of the application of the EC competition rules, and urges its members to play an active part in that body and to provide impetus for its potential in accordance with the strategic role given to competition policy in the EU. 147 It has even congratulated the Commission on the steps it has taken in improving the functioning of the ECN.
148
The EP merely called the Commission to take measures to optimise the exchange of 143 J e g y z ő k ö n y v az Országgyűlés Gazdasági bizottságának 2016. március 22-én, kedden 9 óra 34 perckor az Országház főemelet 37. számú tanácstermében megtartott üléséről, 5-12. J e g y z ő k ö n y v az Országgyűlés Gazdasági bizottságának 2016. szeptember 20-án, szerdán 9 óra 04 perckor az Országház főemelet 37. számú tanácstermében megtartott üléséről, 6-23. 144 See <https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/multisite/ecn-brief/en/brief/editorial> accessed 8 December 2016. 145 information among NCAs within the ECN, and to enhance the quality of such information, with a view to guaranteeing the uniform application of EU competition policy; and to make an effort to promote the correct application of the competition rules in all Member States, and to intervene in good time where the competition rules are being applied unsatisfactorily or in a discriminatory manner. 149 While the EP has clearly voiced its concerns regarding the transparency and accountability of the Commission for its work the same concern has not been voiced with regard to the ECN. This is surprising in light of the fact that the introduction of network governance in general 150 and in particular in EU competition law 151 has been extensively analysed. This analysis clearly demonstrates that networks provide flexibility by enabling cooperation among national and Union experts and officials in order to address a policy issue but at the same time they carry the risk of producing technical discourses and policies that lack the democratic input of citizens and therefore are hazardous to accountability forums such as courts and parliaments. 152 Solutions for the above sketched accountability problem in the field of EU competition law is scarce. Cengiz argued that multi-level deliberative networks and minipublics can directly participate in multi-level policy-making processes and thus remedy the accountability deficit present in the network. 153 De Visser suggested that the ECN should also draw up its own annual work programme and submit it directly to the EP. 154 She also suggested that the law could provide for a periodic review of the ECN's functioning supplemented by deliberation at the accountability forum. While parliaments and courts are the traditional forums of accountability, external administrative institutions of accountability have recently emerged in the form of ombudsmen and audit offices. Similarly, Harlow and Rawlings suggested that 'networks of accountability' be constructed in order to cover the accountability gap in supranational networks like the ECN. These would be built up from traditional accountability machinery such as courts, parliaments and more recent ones such as ombudsmen and audit offices. 155 The above analysis shows that political accountability merely exists at the level of the 
Judicial Accountability
As far as the judicial accountability of the Commission is concerned, the undertaking can file an appeal at the General Court as the first instance court and the CJEU as the second instance court. 156 The General Court reviews questions of facts and law, but the CJEU's review is limited to questions of law. 157 According to Article 31 Regulation 1/2003, the EU Courts may cancel, reduce or increase the fines. The standard of the review by the EU Courts varies from an intensive review regarding, among others, the establishment of the facts and the interpretation of the law, 158 to a marginal review on areas in which the Commission has discretion, such as policy matters and complex economic assessment. 159 The intensity of the judicial review on the point of complex economic analysis has been extensively discussed in the legal literature. 160 Lavrijssen and De Visser's analysis on the intensity of review pictured it as a sliding scale ranging from the extremely marginal review on the one hand to a very relevant in light of the increasing use of settlements and commitment decisions that greatly influence judicial accountability. The Commission has settled in almost 70 per cent of cases since 2010. 162 The use of settlements by the Commission or the NCAs plays an important role in relation to judicial accountability. Research by Hellwig et al. showed that the use of settlements lowers the percentage of litigation. 163 The percentage of litigation is around 60
per cent for average cartel cases, while the undertakings filed appeals in only 10.5 per cent of the settled cases. 164 In addition, the grounds of appeal are limited since the undertaking among others has already acknowledged the facts and the qualification of them and has accepted the amount of the fine. 165 These changes resulted on the one hand in more efficiency and flexibility in the Commission's enforcement (e.g. more frequent use of settlements and commitment decisions) but, on the other hand, they have moved the administrative enforcement system of the EU towards a regulatory enforcement system through giving more discretion to the Commission and reducing the room for judicial review and accountability before the EU Courts.
The level of judicial protection differs greatly across the Member States. This is the result of their procedural autonomy, which allows for differences in the type and number of courts, expertise of the judiciary, burden and standard of proof during court procedures, and time limits. These factors influence the level of judicial protection. The fining decision of the ACM can be appealed by the undertaking fined at two different levels of exclusive competent courts which both review questions of law and facts. 166 Both courts conduct an intensive be considered as high, as a consequence of the full review of questions of law and fact by the two specialised courts, and the fact that the ACM bears the burden of proof. The ACM fining decisions for cartel cases are also often annulled by those courts. 168 In the case of an annulment, the Dutch court has the obligation to rule independently whether a fine can be imposed and what the amount of the fine should be. 169 Decisions of the GVH are subject to judicial review at three different levels of courts that all review questions of law and facts. The final court is the Hungarian Supreme Court, and ultimately, after those three court procedures, the parties may file a constitutional complaint with the Hungarian Constitutional Court. The standard of review in administrative procedural law is that of 'legality'. 170 In Hungarian law, judicial review of the legality of administrative decisions covers breaches of both procedural and substantive law, while it excludes the review of the merits of the administrative decision taken under direct statutory or discretionary powers. The division between the review of legality and the review of merits is, however, not always clear in Hungarian law. review against the GVH's decisions. 172 However, more recently both the Hungarian Constitutional Court and the Hungarian Supreme Court have acknowledged that cartel proceedings are quasi-criminal proceedings requiring special guarantees. 173 Hungarian courts are thus competent to fully review the GVH's cartel decisions and to substitute the GVH's decision with their own, for example, to reduce the fines imposed by the GVH. In 2015, the Hungarian Constitutional Court also investigated how certain procedural guarantees should apply in cartel proceedings. 174 Another problem with Hungarian administrative courts is that they fail to recognise economic interests, even the interests of competitors in competition cases, as direct legitimate interests capable of securing standing in judicial review.
In light of these significant differences among Member States as to the level of judicial protection, it can make a remarkable difference for an undertaking as to which
Member State investigates the case and enforces the competition rules. In this respect it is problematic that the decision to allocate cases to one or other Member State cannot be appealed. As mentioned above, while case allocation is a core function of the ECN, the ECN lacks legal personality and thus no judicial control takes place by either the national or the EU judiciary as the General Court has confirmed. 175 This leaves fundamental questions of jurisdiction and, more importantly, the question by whom and how the ECN can be held accountable, unanswered. Member States and be even seriously undermined in practice.
Conclusion
Likewise, it is the members of the ECN that are separately held accountable by the EU and national courts. In theory the EU Courts comply with the principle of effective judicial protection and conduct a comprehensive review, although the deferential review pertaining to complex economic assessments by the Commission has been criticised by different authors.
In addition, judicial accountability is limited by certain developments such as the use of settlements. The level of judicial protection among the Member States differs and depends on procedural rules, such as the burden and standard of proof, the expertise of the judiciary and the scope and intensity of the review. In light of these significant differences among Member
States as to the level of judicial protection, it can make a significant difference for an undertaking and have a relevant impact on the protection of their rights of defence, as to which Member State enforces the alleged infringement. In this respect it is problematic that the decision (or no decision) on case allocation and on information exchange is not subject to either political or judicial control.
It is this aspect of the shared enforcement of EU competition law that is in need of reassessment. There is also a need for a composite accountability mechanism which is based on similar network governance such as the Network of National Ombudsmen.
